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Abstract
Recent analyses of memory (Robins 2016; Cheng & Werning 2016; Michaelian 2016; Bernecker, 2017) 
propose necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a memory, which are meant 
to set memory apart from related mental states like illusory memory and confabulation. Each of the pro-
posed taxonomies includes accuracy as one of the necessary conditions such that only accurate represen-
tations are memories. I argue that inclusion of an accuracy condition implies a sort of disjunctivism about 
seeming to remember. The paper distinguishes several types of disjunctivism that these taxonomies could 
be committed to. If these taxonomies are meant to be empirically informed, however, then plausibly they 
should be seen to endorse the principle of psychological internalism. The causal argument, a standard 
objection to disjunctivism (Robinson 1985; Burge 2005, 2011), is then used to show that the sort of dis-
junctivism that endorses psychological internalism is mistaken. The ultimate goal is to underscore a lack 
of clarity in the status of recent accounts of memory as either epistemic, nonreductively ontological, or 
reductively ontological in approach.
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0. Introduction
A current research project in the philosophy of memory, explicitly initiated by Sarah 
K. Robins but implicit in earlier work (going back to at least C. B. Martin and Max 
Deutscher),1 is to give an account of what memory is that can distinguish instances of 
remembering from a gamut of related mental states including misremembering, verid-
ical and falsidical confabulation, and veridical and falsidical relearning.  Research in 
this program2 admirably takes account of memory science, and attempts to provide an 
analysis of memory that is not only compatible with this work, but that may be empiri-
cally fruitful; that may “improve diagnosis” of memory errors,3 for example, or even get 
at “how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural 
kind.”4  
This line of work is aimed at identifying all of the conditions in virtue of which a men-
tal state is a memory. Moreover, all of the theorists above insist that representations are 
memories only if they are veridical and factive, in other words, accurate representations 
of the target event. (Of course, other necessary conditions on memory are also invoked.) 
I will argue that if we are interested in giving an account of what memory is that is com-
patible with the assumption of psychological internalism (PI)—which is relatively ortho-
dox across the cognitive sciences—that mental states are internal states of the subject, 
then building an accuracy constraint into our account lets too much epistemology into 
our ontology. What a given mental state is and what epistemic properties it has are, or 
ought to be, separate questions that should be given separate answers. 
The goal of this paper is to motivate two claims. 1) The accuracy condition on memory 
implies some form of disjunctivism about seeming to remember. Namely, if only ac-
curate representations are memories, then although an instance of representing a past 
event accurately and an instance of representing it inaccurately may be subjectively in-
distinguishable, and although they may be subtended by the same neuropsychological 
1  Sarah K. Robins, “Misremembering,” Philosophical Psychology 29, no. 3 (2016) 432–47; C. B. Martin and 
Max Deutscher, “Remembering,” Philosophical Review 75, no. 2 (1966): 161–96.
2  See, for example, Sen Cheng and Markus Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory If It Is a Natural Kind?” 
Synthese 193, no. 5 (2016): 1345–85; Robins, “Misremembering”; Kourken Michaelian, “Confabulating, 
Misremembering, Relearning: The Simulation Theory of Memory and Unsuccessful Remembering,” 
Frontiers in Psychology 7, no. 1857 (2016): 1–13; and Sven Bernecker, “A Causal Theory of Mnemonic 
Confabulation,” Frontiers in Psychology 8, no. 1207 (2017): 1–14.
3  Bernecker, “A Causal Theory,” 11.
4  Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1345.
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mechanisms, they amount to a disjunction of different kinds of mental states. The ac-
curate representation is a memory (providing other necessary conditions are met), while 
the inaccurate representation is a mental state that is fundamentally different in kind. 2) 
If we want to provide an ontology of mind that is compatible with PI, then we should not 
be disjunctivists about memory, in the sense that would be implied by the accuracy con-
dition. Hence, if we want an ontology of mind that is compatible with PI, we are led to 
reject the accuracy condition. Disjunctivism about memory is problematic, I shall argue, 
to the extent that it takes the putative disjunction as one of internal mental state kinds.
The plan for this paper is as follows. The aim of section 1 is to discuss how the accuracy 
condition functions in recent taxonomies of memory, and to show how it leads to the 
disjunctive view about seeming to remember. Section 2 distinguishes several different 
varieties of disjunctivism from the problematic variety that is the target of this paper; 
namely, reductive ontological disjunctivism. Section 3 aims to clarify why a taxonomy 
that is compatible with PI should not build epistemic conditions into what the mental 
state of memory is. This discussion draws on an old line of thought that is sometimes 
called the causal argument against disjunctivism.5 Section 4 concludes.   
1.1 Remembering, Misremembering, and Confabulating 
Robins posed the challenge that recent work has taken up to distinguish remember-
ing from “misremembering” from confabulation.6 “Misremembering,” for Robins, is a 
technical term that refers to the kind of memory error that is characteristic of subjects 
in Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) experiments, for example. The DRM paradigm 
was resuscitated by Henry L. Roediger and Kathleen B. McDermott (1995) from a study 
by Deese (1959).7 Subjects are presented with a series of thematically related items dur-
ing the study phase, traditionally: a list of semantically related words, that are focused 
around a “critical lure.” Here is an example study list that is focused around “sweet.” Sour, 
5  See Howard Robinson, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism,” in Philosophy of 
Mind: Contemporary Readings, ed. Timothy O’Connor and David Robb (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
81–102; and Perception (New York: Routledge, 1994). See also Tyler Burge, “Disjunctivism and Perceptual 
Psychology,” Philosophical Topics 33, no. 1(2005): 1–78; and “Disjunctivism Again,” Philosophical 
Explorations 14, no. 1 (2011): 43–80.
6  Robins, “Misremembering.”
7  Henry L. Roediger and Kathleen B. McDermott, “Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not 
Presented in Lists,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 21, no. 4 (1995): 803–14; Deese; James Deese, “On 
the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall,” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 58, no. 1 (1959): 17-22.
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candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, tart, pie 
(Roediger and McDermott, 1995: 814).8 During the test phase, which may ask the partic-
ipant either to “recall,” i.e., freely produce studied items, or simply to “recognize” which 
ones had been presented, participants typically purport to remember the critical lures at 
rates comparable to those subjects exhibit for items that had actually been on the study 
lists. This is a distinctive sort of error, according to Robins, because making this error—
answering that a critical lure had been on a study list when it hadn’t—requires that the 
subject has some memory of the items that actually had been presented. Otherwise, the 
semantic relatedness of the lure to the targets should have no effect. Yet the false-alarm 
rate for thematically unrelated lures is usually close to zero, and this is good evidence 
that the thematic relation between critical lures and targets is very salient. 
Although the DRM effect is a particularly clear example of “misremembering”—namely, 
accurately representing a past event in some aspects, while inaccurately representing 
it in others—this kind of memory error is very much an everyday phenomenon. That 
misremembering involves some retention of information from the encoding condition 
indicates that it is a different kind of memory error from confabulation, which seems 
not to involve retained information from the target episode at all. Robins argues that it 
is not possible for either archivalists or simple causal trace theorists to explain why it is 
that subjects “misremember” critical lures in the first place. For the archivalist, memory 
functions to store past events and experiences. Similarly, for the causal trace theorist, 
experience is operative in generating a causal trace of the encoding experience that is 
eventually operative in generating the retrieved representation through a continuous 
causal chain of processes. Robins’s charge is that it is hard to square, on this sort of view, 
the fact that subjects appear to succeed in maintaining a trace of the encoding condition, 
which is necessary for the thematic relatedness of the critical lure to be operative, and yet 
fail to accurately remember the word lists at retrieval.9 The trace, allegedly an archive of 
the past experience, is what was supposed to be retrieved. 
On the constructivist view, by contrast, there are no particular traces corresponding to 
particular experiences. On this sort of view, the memory system constructs plausible 
simulations of past events, in the same way that it constructs plausible models of future 
8  Roediger and McDermott, “Creating False Memories.”
9  Allegedly, the causal theorist cannot explain this error as (1) guessing (since participants’ performance 
is good instead of near chance); (2) procedural error or a problem in the search process (since, “if the 
search did not locate the list, then how could the list influence participant responses?” [437]); (3) trace 
decay, (since misremembering is an error of commission and not an error of omission); or (4) noise 
(since the error is highly systematic).
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events (episodic future thinking, EFT), and plausible models of how the past could have 
been (episodic counterfactual thinking).10 The problem for constructivism, according to 
Robins, is that it cannot adequately distinguish what makes it the case that remembering 
is distinct from misremembering is distinct from confabulation.
In the Constructivist’s hands, all representations of past events—whether 
completely accurate, wholly contrived, or somewhere in between—are, in some 
sense, confabulations. The view offers no means for differentiation between 
constructions that are constrained by information retained from a particular 
past event and those that are not.11 
Moreover, the view especially cannot distinguish misremembering from confabulation, 
for the fact that both errors are simply seen to be inaccurate simulations. 
In response, Robins proposes a hybrid theory that takes an archival view of storage and 
a constructive view of retrieval. Remembering is a matter of “retention of information 
from a particular past event and construction of an accurate representation of that event 
at the time of retrieval.”12 On this proposal, subjects remember if and only if both condi-
tions are met. They misremember if and only if the retention condition is met but the 
accuracy condition is not. And they confabulate if and only if neither condition is met.  
1.2 The Accuracy Conditions
 As in the account proposed by Robins, accuracy is established as a necessary condition 
on memory in the analyses proposed by Cheng and Werning, Michaelian, and Berneck-
er.13 These theories are distinguished from that of Robins in maintaining that it is un-
necessary to opt for a hybrid view that is part causalist and part constructivist, because 
one of the pure views can do all the relevant explanatory work. What is important for our 
purposes is not the precise nature of the additional conditions that theorists place on the 
memory process, but rather the accuracy condition they place on its products. Neverthe-
less, it is good to provide a brief characterization of their views. 
Cheng and Werning, and Bernecker take a pure causalist position, where what is nec-
10  Felipe De Brigard, “Is Memory for Remembering? Recollection as a Form of Episodic Hypothetical 
Thinking,” Synthese 191 (2014): 1–31.
11  Robins, “Misremembering,” 444.
12  Ibid., 445.
13  Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory”; Michaelian, “Confabulating”; Bernecker, “A Causal 
Theory.” 
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essary for a state to count as a memory is that it is appropriately causally based on an 
accurate experience, and therefore reflects the experience accurately. Bernecker, for ex-
ample, writes that “memories must be veridical in the sense of being factually correct . . 
. a mental state qualifies as a memory only if it accurately represents the objective reality 
and accords with the subject’s initial perception of reality.”14 This is supposed to occur 
because the accurate experience leaves a causal trace, an impression upon the mind, that 
is eventually operative in generating the retrieved memory by a continuous causal pro-
cess. Here, the causal process must be such that the content of the retrieved representa-
tion is counterfactually dependent on the content of the original experience in that had 
the latter differed, the former would also. 
The account proposed by Cheng and Werning also ensures the sort of accuracy (to the 
facts) and authenticity (to the past experience) that Bernecker insists upon by stipulating 
that the encoding experience must be accurate, and must “ground” the content of the 
retrieved representation. Namely, they require not only that the subject “has a reliable 
experience of the episode E* . . .  called the experiential base,” but also that the content 
of the retrieved memory representation is “ontologically grounded” by the content of the 
experiential base, in that the content of the former is either identical to that of the latter, 
a constituent of that of the latter, or an abstraction of that of the latter.15 It is plausible that 
the ontological grounding condition implies the sort of counterfactual dependence that 
Bernecker has in mind. Moreover, this is a causalist view, like Bernecker’s, because it 
requires that the memory representation is caused by the target experience, if indirectly, 
by a “reliable trace” left by the target experience.
The views of Bernecker and Michaelian are distinguished from that of Robins in the fur-
ther sense that they explicitly allow for the possibility of accurate or veridical confabula-
tion. For Bernecker, a confabulation is either accurate or inaccurate, but necessarily, it is 
not counterfactually dependent in its content on that of the encoding experience because 
it is not related to the encoding experience by the relevant sort of causal trace and at-
tendant processes. On Michaelian’s proposal, there is no retention or causal trace condi-
tion on memory, but rather a reliability condition on the simulation process by which 
memories must be constructed. Michaelian’s necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
on memory are accuracy, internality, and reliability. Memories must be accurate, and 
they must be produced by an internal process that is reliable in the sense that it tends to 
produce accurate representations in close possible worlds. The internality condition is 
meant to distinguish remembering, misremembering, and confabulating from veridical 
14  Bernecker, “A Causal Theory,” 4.
15  Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1354–55.
Schwartz | Memory and Disjunctivism
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1611 | 7
and falsidical relearning, which depend on a process that occurs partially external to the 
subject.16 Thus, internality is meant to provide the means for distinguishing a memory 
of a childhood trip to the seaside, for example, from a representation of the experience 
that is wholly based on external and mediate sources (family stories, photographs, etc.)
Robins  and Michaelian state explicitly that they understand the trio of remembering, 
misremembering, and confabulating to parallel the categories of perception, illusory 
perception, and hallucination, respectively.17 Robins, for example, writes that
the distinction between misremembering and confabulation runs analogously 
to that between illusion and hallucination in the study of perception. In illusory 
perception, one perceives an object as having properties that it does not. 
Hallucination is a more extensive error; it occurs when the entire perceptual 
experience—both what is perceived and how it is perceived is illusive.18 
Perhaps tellingly, there is no standard nondeverbal noun phrase that refers to the state 
of misremembering. For convenience, let’s call it “illusory memory.” In the theories we 
have discussed, memory is distinguished from illusory memory in that only accurate 
representations are memories, and illusory memories are inaccurate. Retention, for Rob-
ins,  causal trace conditions for Bernecker, and Cheng and Werning, and reliability, for 
Michaelian, are supposed to distinguish veridical confabulations from memories, on one 
hand, and falsidical confabulations from illusory memories, on the other.19 Together, the 
conditions entail that seeming to have a memory of an episode is a disjunctive state of 
affairs: some cases amount to memory, some amount to illusory memory, some amount 
to confabulation. The same kind of phenomenology is not a signal of the same kind of 
16  Relearning is generally thought to consist in (1) an encoding experience, (2) imparting information 
about this experience to an external source, (3) forgetting this information, (4) reacquiring it, and then (5) 
representing the target event based on the reacquired information. Relearning is said to be “veridical,” if 
the information represented is accurate, and “falsidical” otherwise.
17  See Robins, “Misremembering,” 434; and Michaelian, “Confabulating,” 2.
18  Robins, “Misremembering,” 434.
19  Cheng and Werning do not explicitly discuss confabulation. Although they say that “a mnemonic 
representation of that episode will also fail to be a case of episodic memory if it is based on the 
imagination or confabulation of that encounter,” it appears that they intend “confabulation” more in the 
sense of hallucination than in the sense of memorial confabulation (“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1360). 
Nevertheless, because the “sequence analysis” is intended to provide necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for episodic memory, it must be capable of determining that confabulations are not episodic 
memories, and we can assume that this job would fall to (S6) “S’s representation with content E at t1 is 
causally grounded in S’s experience of E* through a reliable memory trace” (1354).
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mental state. As Cheng and Werning explain, “a mnemonic representation of an episode, 
say an encounter with a black panther, may fail to be a case of episodic memory because 
the representation is based on a misperception, illusion or even a hallucination.”20 This 
view—which is common among the theories in question—that memories are different 
in kind from illusory memories and confabulations, is somewhat analogous to how dis-
junctive theories of perception have been articulated since J. M. Hinton.21 Here, seeming 
to remember is really a disjunction of different kinds of mental states, as the disjunctivist 
takes seeming to perceive as a disjunction of different kinds of mental states. 
Disjunctive views of perception have been defined in different ways. Versions of dis-
junctivism say there is no “common mental core,” or “highest common factor,” or “most 
specific common kind” of mental state that is shared by the subject in a “good case” (who 
perceives something veridically) and the subject in a “bad case” (whose experience is 
introspectively indistinguishable from a good case, but nonveridical in some respects).22 
Saying the mental state of memory requires accuracy establishes a disjunction between 
memory, on the one hand, and illusory memory and (falsidical) confabulation, on the 
other. The mental state of the subject in the good memory case is different in kind than 
the mental state of the subject in the bad memory case. The good case and the bad case 
are understood to lack a common, most specific answer to the question of what kind 
of mental state is in play. There are, however, various sorts of memory disjunctivism to 
which the theorists in question could be committed, only some of which are virulent.
2. Varieties of Memory Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism, I shall argue, is problematic to the extent that it denies that—with re-
spect to everything that is going on inside the subject—memory, illusory memory, and 
confabulation can sometimes comprise all and only the same mental kinds. Some types 
of disjunctivism are not bound to deny this possibility. For example, epistemological 
20  Bernecker (2017) appears to make the same point: “On this view, one can fail to remember something 
not only because there is something wrong with one’s memory but also because the representation fed into 
the memory process is false. Memory neither allows for a mistake of inheritance not for the inheritance 
of a mistake” (4). My own view is that memory, considered as an ontological kind, should allow for the 
inheritance of a mistake. The inherited mistake need have nothing to do with memory.
21  J. M. Hinton, “Visual Experiences,” Mind 76, no. 302 (1967): 217–27.
22  Timothy Williamson is the source of the cases terminology (Knowledge and Its Limits [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000]). A case is a centered possible world, i.e., a world with a marked subject and time. 
For an overview of the different kinds of disjunctivism, see Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, “Either/Or,” 
in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 57–94.
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disjunctivism (ED) claims that seeming to have a memory is a disjunction of epistemic 
states that are different in kind. This type of disjunctivism is basically anodyne. Memory, 
illusory memory, and confabulation are in fact epistemically different kinds of states. 
They are evidentially different in kind, for example. This view leaves it ambiguous, how-
ever, whether instances of these different epistemic states correspond to different inter-
nal states of the subject. Therefore, ED is not at odds with the argument of this paper. 
A different form of disjunctivism, which I shall call nonreductive ontological disjunc-
tivism (NOD), may also be consistent with the argument of this paper. One way to be a 
nonreductive ontological disjunctivist is to hold that mental states are irreducible propo-
sitional attitudes, in the sense of two-place relations that subjects stand in to propositions 
that are the objects of their thoughts.23 A proposition might be understood as a struc-
tured (i.e., ordered) complex of the referents of subsentential expressions to which the 
subject is related under a certain guise (Russellian). Alternately, a proposition might be 
understood as a structured complex of the meanings of subsentential expressions, which 
has a certain cognitive significance (Fregean). The metaphysics of propositions need not 
detain us as long as we stipulate that the relation the subject bears to the proposition in 
question, the content of the subject’s thought, is not wholly determined by the nature of 
the mental representations involved. Adopting this sort of view, a theorist can maintain 
that “subjects are in mental states, not vice versa”24 and thus that memory, e.g., is not 
some internal state of the subject, or, obviously, of he subject’s brain. Hence, that memo-
ry, illusory memory, and confabulation are considered specifically different mental states 
is consistent with the possibility that all three mental states may be accompanied by all 
and only the same kinds of internal states. However, it is important to note that NOD is 
in tension with the common assumption of psychological internalism (PI), according to 
which mental states are (or at least supervene exclusively on) the internal states of the 
subject.25 (A fuller discussion of PI is given later in this section.) Thus, insofar as the cog-
23 For example, my believing ‘It is 5pm,’ and your believing ‘It is 5pm,’ amount to our occupying the same 
state of mind in assuming the same mental attitude, i.e. belief, toward the same proposition, ‘It is 5pm.’ 
But when I merely desire that ‘It is 5pm,’ I occupy a different mental state, because I take a very different 
attitude toward this propositional content.
24  Williamson, “Replies to Critics,” In Williamson on Knowledge, ed. Patrick Greenough and Duncan 
Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 331.
25  Functional decomposition, which is plausibly the principal methodology of cognitive science (see, e.g. 
Robert Cummins, “‘How Does It Work?’ versus ‘What Are the Laws?’” In Explanation and Cognition, ed. 
Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), seems to evidence PI, in that 
personal-level capacities are analyzed into component functions of internal subpersonal capacities (see, 
e.g., Zoe Drayson, “The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction,” Philosophy Compass 9, no. 5 [2014]: 338–46).
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nitive sciences endorse PI, it is unclear whether and how a proponent of NOD could pro-
vide a taxonomy of memory that is empirically informed, let alone empirically fruitful.
There is a third kind of disjunctive view of memory, however, which we may call reduc-
tive ontological disjunctivism (ROD), and which, I shall argue, we should repudiate. 
On this sort of view, psychological states are thought to reduce to internal states of the 
subject.26 Nevertheless, it is thought that the internal mental states of subjects must be 
different when they remember / misremember / confabulate. This is the sort of view that 
is suggested when Cheng and Werning adduce necessary conditions that are meant to 
validate episodic memory as a natural kind. These authors are quite aware (in fact, Cheng 
is a neuroscientist of memory) that the term episodic memory refers to a neuropsycho-
logical kind.27 Hence, claiming that episodic memory is a necessarily accurate natural 
kind (which is a result of the conditions discussed above,) is to say that memory is a 
different kind of neuropsychological state than those of illusory memory and confabula-
tion. This is an empirical claim, however, and it requires empirical evidence that has not 
been provided. The problem with this claim is actually worse than that it is just empiri-
26  The reduction referenced here need not be a reduction of psychological states to neuropsychological 
states to biochemical states and so on; namely, it need not be an intertheoretic scientific reduction of 
psychology to neuroscience and so forth. Rather, it is merely the assumption that the terms of folk 
psychology will turn out to be either reducible to items in some science of the mind or eliminable.
27  Episodic memory was coined by Endel Tulving to name the sort of memory for experienced events that 
is rich in contextual details (e.g., regarding the what, the where, and the when of the relevant episode’s 
occurrence) (Tulving, “Episodic and Semantic Memory,” in Organization of Memory, ed. Endel Tulving 
and Wayne Donaldson [New York: Academic Press, 1972], 38–403). Episodic memory is contrasted with 
semantic memory for facts that lacks substantial contextual detail of when the information was acquired. 
Episodic and semantic memory are the two forms of what is called declarative memory, memory whose 
content can be consciously accessed and manipulated across a range of retrieval conditions (see Larry R. 
Squire and Stuart Zola-Morgan, “Memory and Brain Systems: 1969–2009.” Trends in Neuroscience 11, 
no. 4 [1988]: 170–75). It remains controversial how to precisely characterize episodic memory. Tulving’s 
more recent account (see Elements of Episodic Memory [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], and 
“Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26, no. 1 [1985]: 1–12), which defines episodic 
memory as the sort of memory that comes with the conscious phenomenology of reexperiencing a past 
event, is a further approach. It is widely known, (and Cheng and Werning particularly stress this point 
[“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1364–76]) that episodic memories are primarily dependent (at least before 
consolidation), upon the hippocampus, while semantic memories are known to depend primarily on 
neocortical regions. Although these memory systems are to some extent dissociable, the extent to which 
they work interdependently is an interesting area of ongoing research (see, e.g., Muireann Irish and Olivier 
Piguet, “The Pivotal Role of Semantic Memory in Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future,” 
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 7, no. 27 [2013]: 1–11; and Daniel Greenberg and Mieke Verfaellie, 
“Interdependence of Episodic and Semantic Memory: Evidence from Neuropsychology,” Journal of the 
International Neuropsychology Society 16, no. 5 [2010]: 748–53).
Schwartz | Memory and Disjunctivism
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1611 | 11
cally unsubstantiated, however (the next section explains how). 
One reason to suspect that ROD is the sort of disjuncitivism to which Robins, Michae-
lian, and Bernecker are also committed is that these theorists engage quite closely with 
the empirical science of memory; they intend their work to be useful in clinical settings, 
or at the very least, compatible with a scientific view of what mental states are. Bernecker, 
for example, says his “paper is to be understood as a friendly offer of help to the medical 
sciences.”28 Michaelian describes his project as “drawing on the resources of philosophy 
but aiming for coherence with psychology.”29 And Robins based the taxonomic program 
upon the need to explain the “DRM effect, one of the most well-established effects in the 
psychological study of memory.”30 Yet psychological internalism appears to be a fairly 
common commitment of cognitive science. Therefore, if Robins, Michaelian, and Ber-
necker are on board with the basic assumption that mental states are internal states of 
subjects, and they are committed to the claim that memory, illusory memory, and con-
fabulation are different kinds of mental states—not just different epistemic profiles that 
the same kind of mental state can assume—then they appear committed to the claim that 
these are different internal states of subjects.  
Stephen P. Stich’s maxim, “what knowledge adds to belief is psychologically irrelevant,” 
gets at the core of psychological internalism.31 Psychology, with the cognitive sciences 
generally, aims to account for mental states in whatever way is most explanatory of be-
havior. Yet whether a belief is accurate does not make a difference to its causal profile; 
it will cause the same behaviors regardless of its accuracy. Hence, what knowledge adds 
to belief, what perception adds to illusion, what remembering adds to misremembering, 
is not relevant to the psychological explanation of behavior. As Jaegwon Kim explains, 
It is only the element of belief in knowing that is causally productive of the 
action. Similar comments apply to believing truly. My truly believing that 
something is so is not more efficacious in producing actions than my merely 
believing that something is so. 
Seeming remembrance can do all of the explanatory work done by remembering. 
Thus, when I act in a certain way in part because of my remembering a certain 
thing, then under the same circumstances my replica will act in the same way 
28  Bernecker, “A Causal Theory,” 2.
29  Michaelian, “Confabulating,” 1.
30  Robins, “Misremembering,” 445.
31  Stephen P. Stich, “Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis,” Monist 61, no. 4 (1978): 574.
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because of his seeming to remember the same thing. Whether or not his seeming 
remembrance is a genuine case of remembering will not affect his behavior.32 
The moral is entirely general. Whether your mental state is accurate is not a feature of 
the physical nature of your internal states, while it is only these features that impact what 
behaviors are caused. Surely whether your mental state is accurate may impact what 
your behavior achieves in the world—whether saying “I do” starts your marriage, for 
example, or whether sliding your card pays for the opera—but  “the job of psychological 
explanation is done once it has explained the bodily action[s].”33 This is the justification 
many have seen for the common practice in cognitive science to classify mental states 
according to their internal features. Here are some other philosophers’ articulation of 
the principle:
No psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any 
individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed.34
The properties and relations to be invoked in an explanatory psychological 
theory must be supervenient upon the current, internal physical properties and 
relations of organisms (i.e., just those properties that an organism shares with 
all of its replicas.35
Internal psychological states are the only psychological states that psychological 
theory needs to invoke in explaining human behavior—the only states needed 
for psychology.36 
The idea of psychological internalism is simply that mental states, as understood in 
cognitive science, are internal states of subjects.37 The difference between accurate and 
inaccurate mental representations need not imply differences in the internal states of 
subjects. Therefore, it is improper to establish accuracy as an individuation criterion for 
32  Jaegwon Kim, “Psychophysical Supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 63, 65.
33  Ibid., 64.
34  Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of Meaning,” in Mind Language, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 220.
35  Stich, “Autonomous Psychology,” 575.
36  Kim, “Psychophysical Supervenience,” 59.
37  Cf. Drayson (“Personal/Subpersonal Distinction”) for discussion of PI and a line of resistance 
Williamson, and Clark and Chalmers have offered to it. 
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mental states, given PI. In light of these points, the choices it appears that Robins, Mi-
chaelian, and Bernecker are faced with are either to endorse NOD, a position that takes 
a fundamentally different view of the nature of mental states than that which is orthodox 
in cognitive science; endorse ROD, which is implausible for reasons we shall explore 
shortly; or reject ontological disjunctivism about memory.
3. Rejecting ROD
What is often called the causal argument against disjunctivism was advanced by 
Robinson,38 (although he traces this way of thinking back to Berkeley). More recently, 
the argument has been also adapted by Burge.39 The first step of Robinson’s version of 
the argument is the premise that there does not need to be anything internally, i.e., neu-
rally, that distinguishes an instance of veridical seeing from an instance of hallucina-
tion. Namely, (1) it is possible, at least in principle, to artificially initiate the same neural 
mechanisms that are involved in a case of veridical perception, and thereby cause an 
instance of hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from the veridical percep-
tion. The second step of the argument is to motivate the claim that “it is necessary to give 
the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experiences . . . if they have the 
same proximate—i.e. neural—cause.”40 The second step of the argument is supported, 
according to Robinson, by the general principle that “same proximate cause, same im-
mediate effect.”41 If we hold fixed the salient background conditions across the cases in 
question, and we are interested in the nature of the effect, i.e., the mental state, seen from 
a purely causal perspective, the principle appears plausible.
In Burge’s version of the argument, you are asked to consider a case of veridically per-
ceiving an object, which, as you blink, is replaced by a duplicate object, which is then 
removed at the same time that you experience a visual illusion—caused by a strange con-
fluence of light—that is indistinguishable from the experience of the original object.42 
The first step of Burge’s argument is not intended to establish the absence of a difference 
in the internal proximal causes of a case of veridical perception and a case of halluci-
nation, but rather the absence of an internal causal difference between the causes of a 
veridical perception and two cases of illusion. What is important here is that the sensory 
38  Robinson, “General Form.”
39  Burge, “Disjunctivism”; “Disjunctivism Again.”
40  Robinson, “General Form,” 89.
41  Ibid., 90.
42  Burge, “Disjunctivism,” 25.
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impingement on the retina, and across the entire body, is supposed to be qualitatively the 
same across these cases. Although Burge’s case is no doubt contrived, the fact that differ-
ent objects in the distal environment can cause qualitatively the same proximal stimula-
tion upon the organism is a familiar symptom of the general underdetermination of our 
perceptual representations by the perceptual data. Burge does not rest the second stage 
of the argument on the truth of the general principle, “same proximal cause, same im-
mediate effect,” but rather by the commitment of vision science to this principle within 
the specific domain of perception.
He describes the proximality principle (PP) as follows: 
Holding constant the antecedent psychological set of the perceiver, a given 
type of proximal stimulation (over the whole body), together with associated 
internal afferent and efferent input to the perceptual system, will produce a 
given type of perceptual state, assuming that there is no malfunctioning in the 
system and no interference with the system.43
Thus, given the assumption that an illusory perception can, at least in principle, be 
caused by the same proximal stimulation (given the same residual state of the perceiver) 
as a veridical perception, the proximality principle implies that the resultant illusory 
perception amounts to the same type of perceptual state as the veridical perception. It 
appears that reductive ontological disjunctivism about perception is mistaken insofar as 
it denies this. 
It is time to apply this way of thinking to the case of memory. One immediate obstacle is 
that experience does not stand to memory as a proximate cause stands to an immediate 
effect. Rather, numerous processes intervene between the experience encoded and the 
memory retrieved. Thus, the principle of Robinson and Burge that (other things equal) 
the same proximate cause leads to the same immediate effect does not itself imply that, 
given the same kind of perceptual state as input, we get the same kind of memory state 
as immediate output; memory is no immediate effect of perception.44 Nevertheless, the 
familiar considerations of “causal contiguity and continuity” apply here as ever.45 There is 
no way for a cognitive system, including memory systems, to be sensitive to differences 
in the distal causes of perceptions unless these differences affect the sensible proximal 
stimulation upon the organism. Otherwise, such differences in the distal facts are simply 
43  Burge, “Disjunctivism,” 22.
44  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
45  Kim, “Psychophysical Supervenience,” 65.
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not available for processing. As Burge says, “the effects of distal causes are entirely ex-
hausted by their effects on proximal causes.”46  
If we take our lead from Robinson and Burge that accurate and inaccurate perceptual 
representations are sometimes the same kind of mental state because they arise from the 
same kind of proximal stimulation, then we can assume that these mental states would 
have to provide the same kind of input to memory. Therefore, assuming no further evi-
dence is forthcoming that one of these input experiences had been inaccurate, it would 
be difficult to explain how the memory system could instantiate a different kind of in-
ternal state, because the memory of this inaccurate experience would itself be inaccurate 
in turn. But the claim that the internal memory system instantiates different kinds of 
mental states when it represents the past accurately versus inaccurately, and that it does 
this of necessity, is the central thesis of ROD about memory. To illustrate the problem, 
imagine the following: At some time, three physically identical subjects register quali-
tatively identical proximal stimuli, which cause each to have an experience as of a red 
tomato. Ever after, each subject takes herself to have seen a red tomato on the occasion 
in question, never having received any evidence to the contrary. But in fact, while one 
subject had truly seen a red tomato, the second had experienced an illusion of a green 
tomato’s being red, and the proximal stimulation on the third subject had miraculously 
been caused by a strange confluence of light. These experiences are input to memory, 
and at some later time, each subject retrieves a representation of the experience. The 
first subject’s memory representation is accurate, but the second and third subjects’ rep-
resentations are inaccurate. Does it follow that these subjects’ internal mental states are 
different in kind?
It would be unaccountable for the subjects’ memory systems to somehow access the 
nature of the distal things in themselves that occasioned the encoding experiences, and 
to instantiate different kinds of internal states accordingly. If we are to suppose that the 
mind/brain can take on different internal states in response to differences in the distal 
environment that made no difference to the proximal stimulation upon the organism, 
then we are left with a mystery of how this could possibly be accomplished. Are we to 
suppose that the distal environment acts upon the mind at a distance, or that mind is 
sensitive to the distal facts through ESP? The difference that made one perception veridi-
cal and the other nonveridical was at no point available for processing, so it is unclear 
how it could cause a difference between the internal memory states. 
This argument does not support the idea that inaccurate representations of the past are 
never a different kind of mental state than accurate representations of the past. This will 
46  Burge, “Disjunctivism,” 22.
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likely occur when the representations in question are produced by different kinds of 
cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, if internal memory states differ in kind, it is not 
by virtue of whether their content is accurate, but rather because of a difference in their 
causal profiles. It is incorrect to see the internal memory system as capable of infallibly 
tracking the accuracy of its representations, and of taking on different kinds of internal 
states accordingly. It is possible for the same kinds of internal memory states to bear 
content that is accurate or inaccurate.
4. Conclusion
There are numerous ways to resist the causal argument against disjunctivism, but the 
most obvious of them abandon the reductive view of mental states that is part and parcel 
of PI, and which seems to be a common assumption in the cognitive sciences. The cor-
rect moral to take away is not that the recent line of work in the philosophy of memory 
that seeks to distinguish memory from illusory memory from confabulation is misdi-
rected. Rather, the point is that the job that recent memory taxonomies are intended 
to perform is unclear. It is unclear whether they are, perhaps, solely intended as epis-
temological taxonomies of the circumstances in which mental states count as having 
certain epistemic properties; whether they are only committed to ED. Or perhaps they 
are ontological taxonomies of when a mental state counts as taking the memory relation 
to a mind-independent proposition, as opposed to some different propositional attitude; 
i.e., perhaps they are only committed to NOD. Last, perhaps they are indeed meant as 
taxonomies of internal mental state kinds, (as clearly seems to be Cheng and Werning’s 
view). If this is how the recent memory taxonomies are intended—if they are committed 
to reductive ontological disjunctivism—then I claim it is a mistake for them to make ac-
curacy a necessary condition on memory. 
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